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Abstract  
The paper explores the changing risk of poverty for older and younger generations of 
Italians throughout the republican period, 1948 to the present day. We show that poverty 
rates have decreased steadily for all age groups, but that youth has been left behind. The 
risk of poverty for children aged 0-17, relative to adults over 65, has increased steadily over 
time: in 1977, children faced a risk of poverty 30 percent lower than the elderly, but by 
2016 they are 5 times likelier to be poor than someone in the age range of their 
grandparents. This intergenerational reversal of fortune is unprecedented in Italy’s post-
WW2 history. We also assess the impact of the Great Recession on living standards by age, 
finding that the young have been hit hardest, particularly in Southern regions. What 
explains the extra poverty risk associated with young age? Our analysis points to the 
welfare state, which offers better protection for the elderly than it does for the young and 
their families. We find that the impact of cash transfers on the incidence of child poverty 
is considerably lower in Italy than in most comparable countries. Overall, in the last seven 
decades, Italy has become no country for young people. 
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In 1961 Italy celebrated its one hundredth anniversary as a unified country. After 
overcoming the hardships of the postwar years, Italians achieved remarkable 
improvements, not only in terms of economic growth (GDP, private consumption, 
and many other non-monetary socio-economic indicators), but also in terms of 
distribution of the benefits of such growth: recent studies have documented that 
both inequality and absolute poverty declined in the long run (Vecchi 2011). It is 
no accident that those years were to be labeled as miraculous in the literature that 
flourished after World War II (Toniolo, 2013).  
Fifty years later, in 2011, the sesquicentennial anniversary of Italy’s unification 
took place amidst difficult years, marked by a multiple-dip crisis, with high overall 
unemployment, and youth unemployment even higher and obdurately on the rise. 
Plummeting investments were feeding concerns about the future. With no signs of 
new economic miracles in sight, celebrations kept an overall low profile. The 
“reversal of fortunes” that followed a period of unprecedented prosperity and 
growth has prompted a renewed interest in the issue of poverty, both in academic 
and institutional circles. The notions of the reversibility of economic miracles, of a 
“crisis” that may be more endemic than temporary, and thus better described as a 
“decline”, have recently began to resonate with the public. The question of the 
distribution of prosperity across younger and older generations is part of this 
ongoing debate, the underlying concern being not only intergenerational fairness, 
but future growth, and Italy’s ability to rebound: a country where younger 
generations are crippled by hardship, instead of thriving, is one where the future 
does not look bright. 
The topic of age and wellbeing has been approached from different angles. Rossi 
(1997), and Boeri and Perotti (2002) denounced the inadequacy of a welfare state 
skewed in favor of older generations. Berloffa and Villa (2007, 2010), and 
Brandolini and D’Alessio (2011) investigated intergenerational differences in 
household incomes – they tested the idea of younger Italians lagging behind their 
parents’ living standards. Schizzerotto, Trivellato and Sartor (2011) also asked the 




well-documented (overall positive) answer. Cannari and Franco (1997), Saraceno 
(1997), Toniolo and Vecchi (2007), and Brandolini (2010) focused on children. On 
the whole, however, the link between poverty and age in Italy is still under-
researched. 
With this paper, we aim at investigating how the incidence of poverty has varied 
with age during the post-WW2 years. We are not aware of any systematic 
investigation analyzing and comparing living standards of the young and the elderly 
over the entire postwar period. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we 
focus on the trend of absolute poverty separately by age categories – this is the main 
yardstick that we have chosen for our analysis. Secondly, we extend the time 
horizon of the analysis, covering both the aftermath of the Second World War, and 
the most recent years, those hit by the so-called Great Recession (the financial and 
economic crisis starting in 2007). We do so by using eclectic historical statistical 
sources, although the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) and Istat’s EU-SILC are the main datasets that we rely on. Thirdly, we 
analyze the causes of observed trends, and place them in an international context. 
With all the methodological and conceptual caveats that are in order, we argue that 
Italy has turned into a country increasingly unfavorable to young generations. The 
benevolence shown in the early stages of Italy’s economic development (Vecchi 
and Coppola, 2006) has faded – Italy is no longer a country for young men (and 
women: Mancini, 2018). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out concepts, methods and data 
used for the empirical analysis. Section 3 provides a descriptive reconstruction of 
the historical macroeconomic context, focusing on the long-run trends of poverty 
and inequality. Section 4 provides an overview of the intertemporal profile of 
poverty rates by age, and section 5 is devoted to the impact of the Great Recession. 
Section 6 discusses the impact of cash transfers on child poverty, and section 7 




2 Concepts, data and definitions 
This section provides a short overview of the way we define, measure and estimate 
poverty in the rest of the paper, and discusses the pros and cons of the approach 
taken in regard to each of these steps. 
Defining poverty is probably the most contentious issue. This stems from the fact 
that the standard of living is a multidimensional concept: few scholars would 
question the idea that economic well-being is only one of many attributes of human 
life that contribute to one’s overall standard of living (Aaberge and Brandolini, 
2015). In practice, the largest portion of the economic literature, as well as most of 
the international practice, is based on a unidimensional conceptual framework, 
where the level of either income or expenditure serves as a proxy to account for the 
many facets that define well-being. The replacement of a vector of attributes with 
a scalar wipes out the analytical difficulties of dealing with a multidimensional 
definition of standard of living, but is not without certain shortcomings. A radical 
critique comes from the capability–functionings perspective (Sen 1985, 1992), 
according to which there is no escape to the intrinsic multidimensional nature of 
well-being: while it is undisputable that a person with a sufficiently high income 
will be able to improve some non-income attributes, income (or consumption 
expenditure) alone may not be taken as a synonym of wellbeing (Bourguignon and 
Chakravarti, 2003). In this paper we follow the mainstream among economists, and 
embrace a theoretical framework which relies on a unidimensional monetary 
definition of the standard of living. 
Measuring poverty is also far from straightforward. Two main choices matter. First, 
the choice of a monetary indicator used to proxy the living standards, in practice, 
the choice between income versus consumption expenditure. Second, the choice of 
a poverty line. According to Deaton (1997), and Deaton and Zaidi (2002), 
consumption expenditure is the best choice – it is consistent with the standard 
microeconomic theory, and it works well empirically. Atkinson (2015) argues that 
“the choice between consumption and income depends on the purpose of the 
analysis. In the case of poverty measurement, the answer depends on which of two 




of living; the second concept is concerned with the right to a minimum level of 
resources. Historically, studies of poverty have adopted the first approach (…). 
Over time, however, attention began to shift to a broader definition of poverty based 
on the capacity to participate in the life of society, and with this came the interest 
in the concept of minimum rights to resources, the disposal of which is a matter of 
individual decision” (p. 35). Meyer and Sullivan (2012) provide a balanced 
illustration for the case of the United States, and end up using both measures, which 
is a most sensible exercise when a country can offer such a possibility. This is the 
case of Italy, where we are in a position to explore both measures. The Bank of 
Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) – see Brandolini (various 
years) – is a large-scale nationally representative survey that covers the years 1977-
2016, and focuses on household income. Similarly, the National Statistical Institute 
(Istat) runs a yearly survey focused on household consumption expenditures, with 
data publicly available from 1980 to the present day. In this paper we concentrate 
on SHIW’s income data, as far as the historical trend of poverty is concerned 
(section 4), and on Istat’s expenditure data for international comparisons (section 
5). Figure 1 shows the distribution of per capita income in 2016, which represents 




Figure 1 – The three building blocks of poverty measurement 
 
Source: our elaboration on SHIW 2016. 
 
Secondly, the poverty line. Poverty cannot be defined independently of the 
historical and social context of reference (Citro and Michael 1995). Some scholars 
advocate the use of a relative poverty line, i.e. a cutoff value identified in relation 
to the overall distribution of income (Foster 1998); other scholars have favored an 
absolute poverty line, i.e. a value corresponding to how much a household is 
expected to spend to meet its basic needs. The relative poverty line is typically 
defined as a fraction of the average level of income of a reference social group 
(Townsend 1962, 1979; Atkinson 1998). The most common type of relative poverty 
line sets the threshold as a given percentage for the median, e.g. the European Union 
uses a poverty line equal to 60 percent of the median (equivalized) income. In 
contrast, absolute poverty lines are based on estimates of the cost of basic food 
needs (i.e., the cost of a basket considered minimal to enable an individual to live a 
healthy and socially active life) in a specific country (Ravallion, 1994, 2016). We 
use absolute poverty lines when analyzing the trend of poverty over time in Italy 




poverty lines for the year 2006 (corresponding to 5,557 euros/adult/year in 2017 
prices), and apply it, adjusted for inflation, to all years in the span going from 1977 
to 2016 (the period covered by SHIW microdata).1 We fall back on the EU standard 
of using relative poverty lines when making international comparisons (Section 5). 
Finally, estimating poverty requires suitable data and the choice of one or more 
specific poverty measures. Regarding the latter, many are available in the literature. 
The common practice has become to focus on the headcount poverty ratio, defined 
as the proportion of individuals classified as poor out of the total population. We 
follow this conventional approach, in order to maximize comparability with both 
the literature and official publications. However, despite its popularity, the 
headcount poverty ratio is arguably not the best measure (Sen, 1976). Foster, Greer 
and Thorbecke (1984) introduced an interesting class of poverty measures, now 
commonly referred to as FGT-measures, that satisfy desirable properties. Zheng 
(2007) has reviewed and assessed a large portfolio of other measures. 
One more technical issue warrants attention in our context: poverty indices, in 
particular the poverty headcount, are commonly interpreted as counts of individuals 
in poverty, although they are derived from household-level data on income or 
expenditure. The transition from household to individual welfare requires 
assumptions on how resources are shared within the family, on differences in 
individual needs (between children and adults, for instance), and economies of scale 
(some goods, such as household appliances, do not require proportionally higher 
expenditure for them to be enjoyed by a higher number of family members). It has 
been shown that estimates of the number of elderly or children in poverty are 
sensitive to the choice of these assumptions (Deaton and Paxson, 1997). Our 
estimates are based on household equivalent income, which is defined as the total 
income accruing to the household, divided by the number of adult equivalents 
residing in that household. Household equivalents are, in turn, defined on the basis 
of the OECD-modified scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 
                                                 
1 This choice is due to the lack of a series of periodically updated and consistently defined poverty 
lines that covers the whole period (Istat’s official poverty lines are available starting in 2005). Rather 




0.5 to each additional adult member and of 0.3 to each child (Hagenaars et al., 
1994). 
A final remark concerns comparability among surveys. A growing literature 
suggests that changes in survey design need to be considered when analyzing trends 
in consumption, inequality or poverty over time (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 1997; 
Beegle et al. 2012). Seemingly minor changes in survey design – such as i) different 
methods of data capture (e.g., diary versus recall), ii) different respondents 
(individuals versus households), iii) different reference periods for which income 
or consumption are reported – can have significant effects on the poverty measures 
and may distort time comparisons. Regarding the Bank of Italy’s Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which is the basis for much of the analysis 
presented in the following sections, Baffigi et al. (2016) indicate 1985 as a turning 
point that marked the restructuring of the survey: among other innovations, the size 
of the sample was doubled, the sampling procedure was improved, and the survey 
became biannual instead of annual. Other relevant innovations, such as the 
introduction of a panel component in 1989, left the main survey unaffected. It is 
worth noting that the publicly available SHIW microdata, covering the period 1977-
2016, are the result of a massive recovery and harmonization effort by the Bank of 






3 Poverty and inequality trends in Postwar Italy 
Italy is among the ten richest countries in the world today in terms of share of global 
GDP (World Bank WDI, 2017). This is reflected in the living conditions enjoyed 
by a majority of Italians, which are, by global standards and by many fundamental 
indicators, no less than prosperous. Italy’s current status as a country that has “made 
it” is not without contradictions and challenges, which manifest in large disparities 
in wellbeing outcomes within the country, pockets of deprivation that still linger 
for certain categories of the population, and doubtful prospects for future growth. 
These nuances, some of which are the subject of this paper, are better understood 
when the current situation is set in historical context. 
Our historical knowledge on the many facets of Italy’s modern economic growth 
has greatly improved in the past few years. Amendola and Vecchi (2017) and 
Amendola, Salsano and Vecchi (2017) have identified the long-run trends of both 
inequality and poverty over the period 1861-2011. Figure 2 focuses on the post-
WW2 period, and shows the results obtained after updating those estimates with the 




Figure 2 – Trends of household income, inequality and absolute poverty, Italy 
1948-2016 
a. Quantiles of household per capita income vs. GDP per capita 
 
b. Inequality (Gini index, %) 
 





Sources and notes: Panel a: GDP from Bank of Italy, percentiles of per capita income based on 
SHIW. Panels b and c: estimates for 1948, 1967-1975 are from Amendola et al (2017); estimates for 
1977-2016 in panel c are based on SHIW data on per adult equivalent income, as per the OECD-
modified scale. 
Three main conclusions can be gathered from Figure 2. First, Italy has experienced 
an unquestionably great improvement in wellbeing, visible in all metrics when we 
compare 1948 to recent years. Real median income is almost seven times as high in 
2016 as it was in 1948: poverty has been “vanquished”, and is now below 10%, 
down from a level of more than 30% just after the War, inequality is significantly 
diminished. The second conclusion is that these improvements seem reversible. In 
fact, the trends of both poverty and inequality tip upwards in recent decades. Third, 
as should be expected in a country as scarcely integrated as Italy, both levels and 
trends of inequality and poverty differ widely across geographical macro-areas. 
After more than 150 years the “questione meridionale” is still in the data (Felice 
2011, 2013; Daniele and Malanima 2011). 
These contrasting facts call attention to the issue of distribution of gains in 
wellbeing, to the “winners and losers” that emerge during times of profound 
economic transformation and modernization. The analysis of the so-called growth 
incidence curves (GIC), first introduced by Ravallion and Chen (2003), adds 
important insights to this picture. Macro-area specific GICs for the Postwar period 




Figure 3 – Growth incidence curves, 1948-2016 
Italy, 1948-1977 Italy, 1977-2016 
  
Center-North, 1977-2016 South and Islands, 1977-2016 
  
Sources: our estimates based on Luzzatto Fegiz (1949), SHIW (1977-2016). 
Note: GICs for Center-North and South-Islands refer to the distribution of per capita income within 
each macro-area. 
 
The top-left panel of Figure 3 connects the distribution of income extracted from 
one of the earliest nationally representative surveys of household income, carried 
out by the Doxa Institute in 1948, to the first available wave of the Banca d’Italia 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth, started in 1977. The curve suggests that 
during the first decades after the War we observe a shift of the entire income 
distribution, with most segments of the population enjoying large gains in income 
– the bottom decile of the distribution, together with the very top, may have lagged 
behind the bulk of the population, although their incomes also rise during this 
period. The other three panels of Figure 3 focus on the years 1977-2016. The shape 
of the GIC for Italy as a whole suggests that economic growth during this period 




two-three deciles of the distribution. The quality of growth – seen from a 
distributional standpoint – reveals a negative trait, lack of inclusiveness: the income 
of the poorest among the poor grows, but at a slower pace than for the non-poor. 
The geographic breakdown (bottom panels) shows that a similar story holds true 
both in the northern and southern regions. The main difference between the two 
areas is not on the quality of growth but its intensity: the Centre-North grows more 
rapidly than the South and the Islands. Divergence, that is, an increase of the 
average North-South gap, is clearly visible from the GICs in Figure 3. 
This section provides the backdrop for the analysis of the link between poverty and 
age. What role did younger and older generations play in Italy’s postwar success 
story, when wellbeing was achieved? Did these roles change during the recession 
years? And are the differences between Northern and Southern regions relevant 
when we look at the incidence of poverty across generations? These questions are 
addressed in the next section. 
4 Poverty among children and the elderly, 1948-2018 
4.1 From the War to the Miracle 
It is not easy to come across clear-cut evidence on the living standards of specific 
population groups, such as the youth or the elderly, for times that predate the onset 
of modern household income and consumption surveys. A few recent studies have 
added to our knowledge of child wellbeing during Italy’s post-Unification history, 
arguing that Italy has traditionally been a place not hostile to children (Cinnirella et 
al. 2017). Other indicators are in agreement, overall, with this trait of Italian history 
(e.g., A’Hearn and Vecchi, 2017). There is no quantitative evidence, however, on 
how age related to poverty and deprivation more generally before the Second World 
War. 
When the focus shifts to the Postwar period, and the interest is on direct indicators 
of poverty, the information available becomes relatively more abundant. The first 
examples of “modern” enquiries on the incomes and standard of living of Italians 




to carry out actual income and expenditure surveys would not start until later, these 
pioneering enquiries hold information that is invaluable for welfare analysts. 
Microdata for these early surveys have not yet resurfaced, despite the best efforts 
of archivists and historians. Our ability to produce estimates disaggregated by 
population groups, such as children and the elderly, is therefore entirely dependent 
on published results and summary statistics. 
The 1948 Doxa inquiry on the incomes of Italian families, with its multitude of 
tabulations exploring many different angles of Italians’ daily life at the time, is the 
earliest of such attempts. The Doxa Institute was a private research-oriented polling 
company, founded in 1946, immediately after the Second World War, by Pierpaolo 
Luzzatto Fegiz, a professor of Statistics at the University of Trieste (Rinauro 2002). 
Leading with the question, “Is it possible to administer a modern state without 
recent and reliable data on the level and distribution of national income? Probably 
not” (Luzzatto Fegiz 1949: 123), he wrote to Luigi Einaudi in July 1947, with a 
request for funding a large-scale survey on the incomes and expenditures of Italian 
families – see Baffigi, Cannari and D’Alessio (2016). The Ministero del Bilancio, 
delle Finanze e del Tesoro reacted promptly and, as early as December of the same 
year, 16 million Italian lire (corresponding to 250,000 euro at 2017 prices) were 
granted to Doxa. By December 1948, 10,700 households had been interviewed, and 
preliminary results were made publicly available. 
While the 1948 Doxa report (Luzzatto Fegiz, 1949) contains evidence on the overall 
distribution of incomes (“Una prima conclusione balza evidente dall’esame dei 
grafici: l’Italia è un paese di povera gente”, p. 42), the link between age and poverty 
is not considered, and incomes are never disaggregated by age groups. Similarly, 
Luzzatto Fegiz (1950) did not share any additional detail on poverty risks separately 
by age.  
On October 12, 1951 the Camera dei Deputati approved the implementation of the 
first institutional large-scale inquiry into poverty and into the means to combat it 
(Inchiesta sulla miseria in Italia e sui mezzi per combatterla). Although the stated 
goal of the initiative was quantifying poverty, the methods used do not meet modern 




the committee decided not to calculate a poverty line – as illustrated in section 2 – 
but opted for an eclectic approach, grading poverty into four levels (poor, needy, 
average, and high), and establishing disparate indicators of living standards (the 
number of people per room, the frequency of consumption of certain food items 
such as meat, sugar and wine, and the conditions of clothing and footwear), a 
solution that Amendola et al. (2017: 341) described as “undefined at the conceptual 
level”. More than 4,000 pages, organized in sixteen tomes, were produced to 
present the results of the enquiry, but no specific attention is paid to the age factor. 
After the Inchiesta sulla miseria, very little was accomplished during the 1950s in 
terms of social surveys. The absence of detailed information on incomes by age in 
the major sources of the 1940s and 1950s suggests proxy variables are needed. 2  
For this, the Doxa Institute is, once again, the most useful for our purposes. In 1956, 
Doxa celebrated the first decade of activity and printed a commemorative book, a 
collection of surveys previously published in the Bollettini Doxa. In Luzzatto Fegiz 
(1956), the link between living standards and age only shows up when it comes to 
discussing “happiness”. “Perhaps it is silly to ask a stranger point blank – ‘Do you 
feel happy or unhappy in this moment?’; but if one repeats the question to thousands 
of people from every region, age and social class, and compares the answers of 
different groups, then one can learn a great deal.” (p. 74) – this is how the survey is 
introduced. Figure 4 shows the pattern of happiness by age in 1947. 
 
                                                 
2 De Meo (1965, 1973) reports inequality indices for the distribution of household expenditures, 
based on Istat’s household budget surveys for 1953-54 and 1963-64 – the time trend is to be 




Figure 4 – “Very happy” and “unhappy” Italians, by age cohort, in 1947 
 
Source: our elaboration from Doxa (1956). 
 
Figure 4 shows that, in the aftermath of World War Two, happy Italians are a 
minority. In line with the findings of the 1948 Doxa survey on the low incomes of 
Italians, poll results indicate that very few individuals reported being “very happy”, 
about 5% of the entire population, compared to 18% who report being “unhappy”. 
Figure 4 shows that the peak of happiness reached 10% for the youngest cohort, 
and then sadly declined through the course of life. Similarly, aging went hand in 
hand with unhappiness: in 1947, by the age of 65, one Italian out of three reported 
being unhappy. The gender gap, not available by age, suggests that the incidence of 
unhappiness was 20 percent among women compared to 16 percent among men. 
Luzzatto Fegiz (1966) reports the findings of another Doxa survey carried out in 
1956, on the “joy and sorrow” of a sample of 1,000 adults. Results of the happiness 
of the respondents are not available by age category, but an interesting question was 
asked: “Among your acquaintances, is there anyone you consider perfectly happy? 
Could you describe this person? How old are happy people?”. Figure 5 shows the 
results. Again, this proxy suggests that in the mid 1950s young people are the happy 




Figure 5 – Age of happy people among one’s acquaintances, Italy 1956 
 
Source: our elaboration on Luzzatto Fegiz (1966: 310). 
 
Surveys of income and consumption continued to be in short supply in the early-
mid-1960s, with the exception of the Doxa polls.3 The reduction in the scholarly 
interest towards poverty in this period can be attributed to the strong increase in 
average living standards occurring during the “economic miracle”, which 
convinced many observers that severe poverty, or better yet misery, was a problem 
of the past. What attracted attention instead was the phenomenon of immigration 
from the backward areas of the South to the booming cities of the North, and the 
process of integration that followed (Morlicchio, 2012). A few surveys were carried 
out on specific population sub-groups, while other surveys – notably those by the 
Bank of Italy and Istat – were being designed and piloted; however, it was not until 
the second half of the 1970s – unsurprisingly, since that was the end of a long period 
of economic expansion – for poverty to receive the attention of both the academic 
community (mainly thanks to sociological studies) and policy makers.  
                                                 
3 During the first half of the 1960s, both Istat and the Bank of Italy carried out pilot surveys – some 





4.2 From the 1970s to the new millennium 
The first institutional poverty estimates for Italy were computed for the years 1973 
and 1978, thanks to an initiative funded by the European Economic Community 
(EEC), within an experimental program named “Action against Poverty” 
(Sarpellon, 1982).  The definition of a poverty line followed the tradition of Walter 
Runciman and Peter Townsend in the 1960s and 1970s: “Poverty can be defined 
objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the concept of relative 
deprivation. (…) Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to 
be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in 
the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or 
are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. 
Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual 
or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs 
and activities” (Townsend 1979: 31). This is what Sarpellon (1982) and 
collaborators did, in practice, by adopting the so-called “international standard of 
poverty line” (Beckerman 1978), which classified as poor all households with a per 
capita expenditure 50 percent lower than the average expenditure in Italy. 
As portrayed by the poverty committee chaired by Sarpellon, Italy in the 1970s is a 
country where the risk of poverty follows a U-shaped pattern with respect to the 
number of family members: it is higher than the average for persons living alone 
and for households with 6 or more members. From this result, we can infer that the 
risk of poverty was not particularly high for households with 1 or 2 children, while 
large families faced a significant risk of poverty. According to Sarpellon (1982, p. 
118), “… poverty is more frequent among the elderly living alone and among large 
families; the first group is prevalent in the Centre-North, the second one typically 
in the South”. The report also highlights the presence of a significant divide 
between the South and the rest of the country. The three major “causes” of poverty 
are identified in: i) inadequacy of earned incomes; ii) lack of earnings 
(unemployment); iii) pensions of insufficient amount. Each of these three causes is 
more frequently found in the Southern regions, producing much higher poverty 
rates. The renewed interest in poverty during the ’80s is testified also by the 




composed of experts from academia and social organizations. The first Commission 
was chaired by Ermanno Gorrieri, a Catholic trade unionist active for a long time 
in the study of tax-benefit policies towards families. The method of analysis that 
the Commission adopted had many points in common with the work coordinated 
by Sarpellon, in particular the choice for a relative poverty line, applied to 
consumption data, considered more reliable than income.  Its results showed a 
prevalence of poverty among the elderly living alone and very large families, 
particularly in the South. 
After conducting pilot surveys in the early 1960s (whose results were not 
published), the Bank of Italy began to collect data on households’ income and 
wealth in 1965, with an annual (later biannual) nationally representative survey, the 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The survey underwent changes 
in its design and data collection, and the 1977 wave is the earliest for which 
microdata are available (Baffigi et al. 2016). Just prior to that threshold, the early 
SHIW waves provide some evidence that younger families enjoyed higher living 
standards than the older ones. For example, the survey for 1969 (Bank of Italy, 
1971) found that the share of households owning some basic durable goods 
(television, refrigerator, washing machine) was much higher for those with head 
aged 31-50 than for those with head older than 65 years of age. Further, only 48.1% 
of single persons and 69.9% of households with two persons owned a refrigerator, 
against 83% of households with 6 members. But 1977 marks the beginning of a 
“modern” era for poverty analysis, one that enables detailed profiles to be produced 
examining poverty incidence across subgroups of the population, such as children 
and the elderly. 
Figure 6 approaches the question of how income varies with age, and compares 
1977 to the most recent SHIW wave available. It shows the Italian population 




incomes.4 Each bar represents the composition of each decile group in terms of age 
cohorts. 
Figure 6 – Share of age groups in per adult equivalent income deciles, 1977 
and 2016 
 
Note: Authors’ elaboration on SHIW. 
The upper panel describes a (young) world where the rich are overwhelmingly 
prime-age individuals, and rarely over-65s. Youth and the elderly are both more 
frequent in below-median income deciles, but the share of older cohorts decreases 
faster with income. Older generations in 1977 Italy seem to fare worse than the 
general population, a finding that is not at odds with the proxy evidence for the 
1940s and 1950s. The situation shown by the lower panel is widely different. Over-
                                                 
4 Equivalent income is defined as household income divided by the number of adult equivalents in 
the household, which is in turn defined according to the OECD-modified equivalence scale 




65s are now almost 40% of the richest decile, and their frequency increases sharply 
with income. The opposite happens to under-18s.  
These effects incorporate both demography (the population has aged between 1977 
and 2016) as well as intergenerational mobility: people who were born before the 
War and Baby Boomers (younger and prime-age cohorts in 1977) maintained their 
relative position in the income distribution, while newer generations (those who 
were under 18 in 2016) are not as well-off as their counterparts of 40 years prior. A 
sharper view of the forces at play is given by the analysis of the trend in absolute 
poverty rates, shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 – Poverty profile by age of individuals, 1977-2016 
  
Note: Poverty line (5,557 euros/adult/year in 2017 prices) derived from the Istat official absolute 
poverty rate in 2006, then applied, adjusted for inflation, to all years. Shaded areas are 95% 
confidence intervals for poverty rates. 
 
The upper panel shows the incidence of absolute poverty by age groups in Italy, 
from 1977 to 2016. In the mid-70s, poverty was still high both among the young 
(0-17 years of age) and the elderly (over 65). The SHIW data are thus fully 
consistent with the picture of poverty that emerges from the report of Sarpellon 
(1982), focused on the same period. The next 40 years are characterized by a clear 




remains high for the younger ones. The report of the Commission of inquiry on 
poverty published in 1996, based on consumption data, confirms the presence of 
this trend for the first part of the period under consideration, finding that from 1980 
to 1994 the risk of poverty increased in particular for households with non-elderly 
heads. Furthermore, that period saw a decline in the incidence of poverty for 
pensioners, and an increase for households of manual workers. At the end of the 
period, in 2016, the poverty rate is very low for the elderly, and high for the other 
age classes. While in the 1970s the youth were slightly less poor than their 
grandparents, now the opposite is true. At the onset of the great recession, a precise 
“Italian model of poverty” has emerged, according to which “poverty is an 
essentially Southern phenomenon, and concerns in particular large households with 
children” (Morlicchio 2012, p. 179). The basic difference with the results of 
Sarpellon, 40 years later, is that the elderly have disappeared from this model of 
poverty. 
4.3 The Great Recession 
The crisis starting in 2007 has had profound consequences on poverty, reinforcing 
the long-run trend described above: it barely touched the elderly, who are protected 
by a social security system that is skewed in favor of pension expenditure, while 
poverty for working-age families soared. The increasing generosity of the pension 
system explains why poverty rates for the elderly have continued to decrease during 
the last few decades, and also why they are not strictly correlated with the economic 
cycle. The other age groups, on the contrary, have suffered from strong increases 
in the incidence of poverty both during the financial and economic crisis of the first 
part of the 1990s and following the onset of the global recession of the last decade. 
The shift of the risk of poverty from the elderly to the young is not confined to Italy 
but represents a trend common to other rich economies (OECD 2014, 2015).  It is 
mainly due to two simultaneous factors: the increasing importance of pension 
expenditure on the welfare states of rich and ageing countries, and the changes in 
their labor markets, with stagnating wages and increasing unemployment levels, 
particularly in the last decade, affecting households with working-age adults. The 




with strong and effective welfare states or those marginally affected by the global 
recession. The replacement of the elderly by the youth as the age group most at risk 
of income poverty is also not a recent event but has been ongoing during the last 
few decades. The global recession has only accelerated this process. The increase 
in the youth poverty rates in Italy after 2007 has been particularly significant due 
to the depth of the recession, producing a fall of about 10 percentage points in GDP 
from 2007 to 2013.  
However, the observation of the dynamics of poverty at the national level conceals 
profound territorial differences. Figure 8 separates the poverty rates for the Centre-
North and the South, showing only what happened to the two extreme age classes 
for the sake of clarity.  
Figure 8 – Poverty profile by age of individuals, North-Center vs. South-
Islands, 1977-2016 
 
Note: Poverty line (5,557 euros/adult/year in 2017 prices) derived from the Istat official absolute 
poverty rate in 2006, then applied, in real terms, to all years. Shaded areas are 95% confidence 
intervals for poverty rates. 
 
Many important facts emerge. First, the long-run fall in the elderly poverty rate has 




elderly poverty rates across areas is now much lower than in the 1970s. Forty years 
ago, in the South the poverty rates of the elderly and the young were similar and 
very high. Afterwards, only the elderly of the southern regions markedly improved 
their living standards, leaving the youth behind. Turning to the younger generations, 
until some years ago the clear correlation between their poverty rate and the 
economic cycle was due mainly to the South, given the steadily low poverty 
incidence in the Centre-North. The Great Recession, however, interrupted this 
stability and produced a marked increase in the poverty risk also for the youth living 
in the Central and Northern regions. After 40 years, poverty has again become a 
problem that concerns the youth who live in all regions of Italy (Gori, 2017).  
This recent increase in poverty rates for the youth living in the Centre-North is only 
partially due to the inflow of immigrant households, which typically have low 
incomes, high fertility rates and concentrate in these regions because of greater job 
opportunities. The top panel of Table 1 shows the incidence of poverty among the 
youth by area of residence and nationality of the head: after 2006, in the Centre-
North poverty increases also for the young living in households with an Italian head. 
Moreover, the bottom panel of Table 1 shows how, with the great recession, poverty 
increases also for small families, especially in the South. 
Table 1 – Poverty headcount (%) for children aged 0-17, by household 
characteristics, North-Center vs. South-Islands 









Nationality of household head     
  Italian 1.2 5.7 2.6 12.6 
  Not Italian 2.4 7.0 15.0 31.8 
Number of children in household     
  1 child 2.2 9.7 3.1 19.9 
  2 children 1.7 6.7 7.1 15.7 
  3 or more children 5.0 7.8 22.6 39.1 
Source: Our estimates based on SHIW.  
The findings presented above indicate that the great recession has partly changed 
the defining characteristics of the Italian “model of poverty”. It is true that poverty 




is, households with many children and low wages or weak labor market attachment, 
particularly if they live in the South. What is new is that the risk of poverty has 
soared also for household types hitherto protected from it, like households with only 
one child living in the Centre-North or households of employees. Poverty ceases to 
be limited to specific areas of the country (the South) and household categories 
(large families) and becomes generalized, while its age structure is still more 
skewed against children.  
The evidence reviewed in this section points to a long-run pattern in poverty among 
children and the elderly during the 70-year-long Republican history of Italy, one 
that features a striking paradigm change about halfway through. Poverty rates for 
the elderly population (people over 65) appear to have been initially highest, before 
they converged to the level prevailing among younger Italians (children under 18) 
throughout the postwar period and the years of the “Miracolo”; the two trend lines 
joined up sometime around the early-mid 1980s, and then, describing a pattern 
resembling a pair of scissors, diverged again, this time with young and elderly 
Italians occupying opposite places in the poverty ranking. Figure 9 visualizes this 
stylized fact, by retropolating poverty rates by age group to 1948. 





Sources: For total poverty rates, Amendola and Vecchi (2017). For child and elderly poverty rates, 
SHIW. Child and elderly poverty rates are back-projected to 1948 using a quadratic polynomial 
regression fit. 
5 Explaining trends in child poverty 
Why is the risk of poverty currently so high for younger generations in Italy? As 
documented in section 4.3, the crisis that started in 2007 was particularly severe in 
the country, producing a significant increase in poverty among families with 
children due to the rise in unemployment for people of working age and to the 
stagnation in earnings. But can the crisis take all the blame for the significant 
extension of child poverty in Italy, or are there other structural causes?  
A comparison with other countries may turn out to be useful in this respect. For this 
comparison, it is easier to rely on relative poverty rates (whereby a person is poor 
if the equivalent income of his/her family is lower than 60% of the median 
disposable income of the country of residence).  Figure 10 shows the incidence of 
relative monetary poverty computed according to the Eurostat criterion for the 
countries of western Europe, distinguishing among three age classes: less than 18, 
from 18 to 64, and over 64. A person is here defined as poor if he/she lives in a 
household with disposable equivalent income lower than 60% of the median of the 
same variable, computed at the national level. Countries are ordered according to 
decreasing values of poverty rates for the younger group.  
For most countries, poverty rates are highest for children, the exceptions being 
Malta, Cyprus, Germany and Finland. All large Mediterranean countries are placed 
at the top end of the graph, with very high poverty rates for young people. At the 
other extreme are countries from continental and northern Europe. The fact that 
Italy shares its position with the other Mediterranean countries suggests that there 
may be some common characteristics in their social structure or in their tax-benefit 





Figure 10 - Relative poverty rates by age, 2016 
 
Note: Relative poverty line set at 60% of median equivalent income. Source: Eurostat 
 
One of the relevant economic factors that these countries have in common is the 
low employment rate for women. The presence of many households with only one 
earner does indeed significantly account for high poverty rates among children. 
Figure 11 shows the presence of a significant negative relationship between relative 
youth poverty and the employment rate of women aged 20-64 across European 
countries in 2016. The simple correlation coefficient is -0.47, meaning that a 1% 
increase in the female employment rate would translate on average into a reduction 
of nearly half one percentage point in the youth poverty rate. According to this 
estimate, which is only suggestive but significant, if Italy had the same female 
employment rate that is on average observed in Europe (65.3% instead of 51.6%), 
its youth poverty rate would decrease from 26.7% to 20.3%. In other words, nearly 




Figure 11 - Child (0-17) relative poverty rate and employment rate of women 
aged 20-64 in European countries in 2016  
 
Note: Relative poverty line set at 60% of median equivalent income. Source: Eurostat 
 
On the other hand, one child out of five would still remain relatively poor, a higher 
percentage than those observed in Continental and Northern countries. Lack of 
work, therefore, is not sufficient to explain the high incidence of poverty among 
Italian children (Saraceno, 2015).  
Other similarities among Southern European countries concern the structure of their 
tax-benefit systems. Since the contribution of Ferrera (1996), it is customary to add 
to the typical three-way split of European welfare systems (Conservative, Social 
democratic and Liberal; Esping-Andersen, 1990) the Mediterranean one, which is 
typical of Southern European countries.  Its main characteristics are the presence of 
a fragmented social protection system, that provides unequal treatment to citizens, 
depending on their position in the labour market and on their age. Some groups are 
much more protected than others. In particular, there is a striking difference across 
generations, whereby the elderly can often benefit from generous pensions, while 
the young will be penalized by the pension reforms of the last two decades and 
currently suffer from the under-development of many policy instruments that would 




childcare, money transfers to households with children, or training and active labour 
market policies (Lynch 2006, Marì-Klose and Moreno-Fuentes 2013, Leonardi and 
Pica 2015). 
While the countries that belong to the Mediterranean welfare regime are less similar 
than a simple classification would suggest, and their welfare systems are currently 
involved in processes of change and adaptation to external factors like the recession 
and the globalization process, certain common aspects may nonetheless help to 
explain the presence of some social phenomena.5 The relatively high poverty rate 
among children is surely one of the more important. In the next section we 
concentrate on one important aspect of the Mediterranean situation welfare regime 
that can play a significant role on child poverty, i.e. the distributional impact of cash 
transfers.  
In Southern European countries, expenditure on cash benefits tends to be dominated 
by pensions, with fewer resources allocated to households and social exclusion. 
Transfers to households are often not universal; rather, they depend on the labour 
market position of adults. In Italy, for example, family allowances to households 
with children (Assegno al nucleo familiare) are reserved to families of employees, 
excluding the self-employed and those who have never worked, and are financed 
by social security contributions, not by general taxation. A universal minimum 
income scheme against poverty, called Rei (Reddito di inclusione) subject only to 
a test of income and wealth, has been introduced in Italy only as from July 2018. 
Before Rei, many poor households with children were excluded from any cash 
transfer (Natali and Saraceno 2017, Baldini et al. 2018).   
                                                 
5 Chauvel and Schröder (2014) have shown that Conservative welfare regimes are more conducive 
to income inequalities between generations, because they fail to protect younger cohorts from high 
youth unemployment, while making lifetime earnings highly correlated with a favorable entry into 





To analyze the impact of cash transfers on youth poverty, we use the Eu-Silc 
database and compare the incidence and distribution of cash transfers for selected 
European countries, i.e. Italy, France, Germany, Spain, UK and Sweden. Data come 
from the Eu-Silc survey for 2016. In this sample, cash transfers other than pensions 
are classified in the following categories: family/children-related allowances, social 
exclusion not elsewhere classified, housing allowances, sickness benefits, 
unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and education-related allowances. We 
study their effects on the distribution of income, ordering individuals, in each 
country, in terms of the pre-transfer disposable equivalent income of the household 
of residence. This pre-transfer income includes pensions but not the 7 categories of 
cash benefits listed above.6  
 Table 2 - Incidence of relative poverty (%) before and after cash transfers 











IT 32.7 27.0 -5.7 23.8 20.7 -3.2 
FR 31.6 19.5 -12.1 20.9 13.8 -7.1 
DE 25.9 15.2 -10.7 21.2 16.5 -4.7 
UK 36.6 18.5 -18.1 25.6 15.9 -9.7 
ES 32.4 29.2 -3.2 26.5 22.3 -4.3 
SE 30.5 18.5 -12.0 23.8 16.0 -7.7 
Note: Relative poverty line set at 60% of median equivalent income. Source: our elaborations based 
on Eu-Silc 2016 
First, we examine in Table 2 how these transfers, taken together, reduce the 
incidence of poverty in the transition from pre- to post-transfer equivalent 
disposable income. With the exception of Germany, the before-transfers poverty 
                                                 
6 Equivalent incomes are once again obtained using the OECD-modified equivalence scale. The 
analysis is conducted at the individual level, associating with each person the disposable income of 
his/her family. Pre-transfer income is defined as household disposable income minus cash transfers 
different from pensions. Since we use for each cash transfer the microdata provided in the survey, 




rates among children are similar in all countries. The reduction in the incidence of 
child poverty produced by cash transfers is, however, much lower in the two 
Mediterranean countries. In the UK, for example, the risk of poverty before 
transfers among the youth is higher than in Italy, but transfers manage to reduce its 
incidence in the UK by as much as 18 percentage points, as against less than 6% in 
Italy.  
The fact that cash transfers prove ineffective when it comes to reducing poverty 
may be due to two different factors: a low concentration of benefits towards the 
poor, or limited total expenditure on these transfers, or both. First, we look at the 
concentration of benefits, starting with the share of poor children who receive them. 
After dividing the individuals of each country in deciles of pre-transfers disposable 
equivalent income, we compute in Figure 12 the share of children living in 
households that receive at least one cash transfer, by decile.  
Figure 12 - % of children reached by cash transfers, by deciles of pre-transfers 
income 
  
Source: our elaborations on Eu-Silc 2016 
Three facts emerge from the cross-country comparison in Figure 12. First, the 
Continental-Nordic countries have universalistic systems, able to cover nearly the 
whole population of children. Second, the UK presents more targeted transfers, but 




coverage rates among the poor. The categorical nature of transfers and the absence 
(in 2015, the year of reference for the income data used) of universal minimum 
income scheme translates into the presence of a share of the poor that is left without 
any cash subsidy. This share is particularly high in Italy, where about 30% of 
children of the first decile are not reached by any transfer at all.  
A more precise measure of the selectivity of benefits towards the poor is provided 
by the coefficient of concentration, which measures the degree to which a transfer 
is concentrated on the lower side of the income distribution. After sorting the 
observations of each country by their disposable pre-transfer equivalent income, we 
compute the coefficient of concentration for total transfers for both the whole 
distribution (first row of Table 3) and only for persons aged 17 or less (second row 
of results). The concentration coefficient can vary between -1 and +1. The more 
negative it is, the more the expenditure for a transfer is targeted towards the poor 
(for more details about this coefficient, see Baldini and Toso, 2009). 
 
Table 3 - Some statistics on the concentration and incidence of total transfers 
 IT FR DE ES SE UK 
 concentration 
concentration coefficient, all 
persons 
-0.19 -0.33 -0.22 -0.29 -0.25 -0.48 
concentration coefficient, only 
children 
-0.24 -0.39 -0.37 -0.35 -0.39 -0.56 
 incidence (%) 
incidence on disposable income, 
all persons 
7.0 10.3 10.3 9.1 14.0 10.4 
incidence on disposable income, 
only children 
9.0 15.5 16.4 8.7 19.6 17.8 
incidence on disposable income 
of the poor, all persons 
17.1 45.0 42.8 27.6 54.1 44.3 
incidence on disposable income 
of the poor, only children 
20.3 54.2 53.3 27.5 62.9 58.2 





According to the results in Table 3, total transfers reduce inequality in all countries, 
but in Italy their concentration towards lower incomes is modest. Even Sweden, 
with a universalistic welfare state, has cash transfers that are more concentrated 
towards the poor, in particular when considering only the distribution of incomes 
in families with children.  
The ability of transfers to reduce poverty depends not only on their concentration, 
but also on their amount. The lower section of the table shows that the incidence of 
total transfers is particularly low in Italy, both on the incomes of the whole 
population and on those of the households with children. Italian children, for 
example, live in households where only 9% of the disposable income comes from 
public transfers, as against 19.6% in Sweden and 16.4% in Germany. The difference 
is more striking among the poor: the incidence of total transfers on the disposable 
incomes of poor households with children is only 20.3% in Italy, as against more 
than 50% in France, Germany and the UK, and 62.9% in Sweden. We can therefore 
conclude that cash transfers do not substantially impinge on child poverty in Italy 
because they are both of limited amount and not very much concentrated towards 
the poor. 
6 Conclusions 
The paper has addressed the link between poverty and age in Italy during the 
decades following World War II. A clear-cut pattern has emerged. On the one hand, 
we find that during the last 60 years or so the incidence of poverty decreases for all 
age groups. A lack of suitable data for the 1950s and the 1960s prevents us from 
producing firm estimates of poverty rates by age that go all the way to the beginning 
of the period, but a number of other sources suggest that this was indeed the case. 
On the other hand, if we focus on the poverty risk for two age ranges at opposite 
ends of the life cycle – children younger than 18 and adults 65 and older – and draw 
the two separate time trends over the last 60 years on the Cartesian plane, with the 
poverty risk on the y-axis and time on the x-axis, we obtain a pattern resembling a 
pair of scissors. One blade, pointing downwards with a steep slope, describes the 




pointing downwards, although much more gradually, describes the slower decrease 
of the poverty risk for the youth. The crossing of the two blades is situated, for Italy 
as a whole, around the mid 1980s. This is the first time, in the country’s republican 
history, that such a re-ranking takes place: the younger one is, the higher one’s 
chances of being poor. What had been, up to that point, convergence of poverty 
risks of children and the elderly to a lower overall level, becomes divergence. In 
fact, since the early 2000s the poverty incidence among children more than doubles, 
unlike the rate among the elderly, which is stationary. Beginning from the mid-
1980s, Italy becomes no country for young people. 
The same scissor-like pattern of age-specific poverty risks is found both in the 
Center-North and in the Southern regions, but differences in levels are large and 
worth highlighting. Irrespective of age, living in the South of Italy currently more 
than doubles the risk of poverty with respect to living in the Northern regions. This 
gap was even more dramatic toward the beginning of the period considered, and 
has been reducing steadily over time. However, while over the last 4 decades people 
over 65 living in the South have followed the general population in catching up with 
Northern regions, the same is not true for children. If anything, children in the North 
have seen their poverty risk increase in recent years, reducing the gap with the 
South in the most dreadful of ways. 
The pattern of a shrinking poverty risk for the elderly, while the youth remains 
vulnerable, is confirmed, and even exacerbated, during the recession starting in 
2007. Overall, our findings support the notion that young Italians – children and 
kids, and particularly those in the South – are more vulnerable to downturns in the 
business cycle than the elderly. This was not the case in the past.  
We have explored some of the reasons that might contribute to explaining this 
phenomenon, that is particularly severe in Italy but by no means exclusive to the 
country. Our findings are consistent with the time trend of the expenditure for 
pensions (increasing rapidly throughout the period here considered) and the 
expenditure for education (decreasing steadily, as a percentage of total spending) – 
see Latino et al. (2017). Over the last few decades, successive cohorts of new 




unemployment spells and steadily increasing wages. The need to provide for a 
greater stock of pensions (both in number and average amount) did not leave 
enough space to reform the welfare state adequately, in order to tackle the new 
social risks that the crisis and the globalization process have produced.  The main 
victims of the combined effect of the economic crisis and of the painfully slow 
reform process of the tax-benefit system have been the younger generations. Further 
evidence-based support to this claim comes from the analysis carried out on cash 
transfers: an ill-designed system, not effective in reducing the youth poverty rate. 
Other examples of political choices (or inaction) with a negative effect on the young 
could easily be adduced. 
We began the paper by mentioning the well-known “economic miracle” that took 
place in the 1950s and early 1960s. The expression was born to describe the 
ballooning GDP of those decades. Welfare analysts interested in inequality and 
poverty have good reasons to call attention to the 1970s, years when we observe a 
sharp decline of both poverty and inequality measures, and that also, perhaps, 
deserve the epithet of “miraculous”. In this paper, we find that the miracle extended 
to the 1980s for older Italians: the incidence of poverty among individuals aged 65 
or more was 15-20 percent in 1977 and 1979, and less than 2 percent in 1989. No 
miracle of comparable magnitude benefitted young people: the incidence of poverty 
among individuals aged 17 or less was 10-14 percent in 1977 and 1979, and 4 
percent in 1989. More importantly, the elderly continued their march towards a 
poverty-free existence, while the youth did not. As a matter of fact, young Italians 
today face approximately the same risk of poverty as their equals in age in the 
1970s. No economic miracle has happened for them, and none is expected. The 
implication is the need for a welfare state reform that balances the scales – 
intergenerational equity should be upgraded to a long- overdue first place in the list 
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